HOW THE GREEK CRISIS IS PROFITABLE FOR THE IMF
By George Vranas
The relationship between Greece and the International Monetary Fund has been, from the start, very contentious to say the least. There is no question that Greece needs to build the trust and confidence of taxpayers and the global capital markets. But, the IMF advice more often than not seems to be more political or ideological than practical. However, the IMF should not be used as a scapegoat for successive Greek governments disappointing performance in building trust and confidence. The EC, especially Germany, enlisted the IMF to act as a foil for any failed policies, arguably smart political insurance.
As the political foil, the IMF was provided with a cash cow to milk: Greece. And, milk Greece it has. Greece has paid almost €4 billion in fees and interest to the IMF since the start of the programme. Interest rates of 3.6% for a super senior risk free lender were almost three times as high as the more junior ESM loans. Greece payments are so important to the IMF that they were 118% of IMF’s operating profit. Since 2010, IMF personnel expense have increased 48% compared to a decline of 8% in the prior seven years. And, not to go unnoticed, the IMF newly refurbished headquarters is 31% over budget at $562 million.
With 97% of IMF’s cost now essentially fixed, losing Greece, Portugal, and Ireland, would cause massive financial trauma at the IMF and may well render it insolvent. So, the obvious question is: does the IMF have an incentive to keep Greece in crisis to protect its own financial survival and continue to milk the Greek cow?